* middleware: treat RemoteAddr as the rightmost hop in ClientIPFrom* ClientIPFromXFF trusted X-Forwarded-For entries in the configured CIDRs but never checked that the TCP peer was one of those proxies. A client reaching the origin directly could pick its own client IP. - ClientIPFromXFF: a peer outside the trusted prefixes is now the client IP and XFF is ignored. Calling it with no prefixes now panics; use ClientIPFromXFFTrustedProxies(1) or pass the proxy's address instead. - ClientIPFromHeader: accepts optional trusted prefixes with the same rule, matching nginx set_real_ip_from, Apache RemoteIPTrustedProxy and Caddy trusted_proxies. Without prefixes, behavior is unchanged. - ClientIPFromXFFTrustedProxies: unchanged; it is for unknown proxy IPs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * middleware: note Cloudflare CIDRs in example are a partial list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
58 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
58 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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// BenchmarkWalkXFF measures the cost of walking a merged X-Forwarded-For
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// chain end-to-end (visitor never stops). Exercises the worst case for
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// ClientIPFromXFF when every entry is in the trusted prefix list, and
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// bounds the absolute cost of a pathologically large attacker-supplied
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// XFF header (subject to http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes).
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//
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// n varies the number of comma-separated entries in a single XFF header.
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// All entries are valid IPs of identical length, so total header size
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// scales linearly with n.
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func BenchmarkWalkXFF(b *testing.B) {
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for _, n := range []int{1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000} {
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entries := make([]string, n)
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for i := range entries {
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entries[i] = "1.2.3.4"
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}
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headers := []string{strings.Join(entries, ", ")}
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b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("n=%d", n), func(b *testing.B) {
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b.ReportAllocs()
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for b.Loop() {
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walkXFF(headers, func(entry string) bool {
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return false // walk to the leftmost entry
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})
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// BenchmarkWalkXFF_RightmostStop measures the common case for both
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// ClientIPFromXFF (rightmost entry untrusted => stop at the first visit)
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// and ClientIPFromXFFTrustedProxies(1). Should be near-constant
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// regardless of n, since the walker stops after the first visit.
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func BenchmarkWalkXFF_RightmostStop(b *testing.B) {
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for _, n := range []int{1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000} {
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entries := make([]string, n)
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for i := range entries {
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entries[i] = "1.2.3.4"
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}
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headers := []string{strings.Join(entries, ", ")}
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b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("n=%d", n), func(b *testing.B) {
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b.ReportAllocs()
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for b.Loop() {
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walkXFF(headers, func(entry string) bool {
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return true // stop at the rightmost entry
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})
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}
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})
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}
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}
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