middleware: harden RedirectSlashes handler (#1044)

This commit is contained in:
Peter Kieltyka 2026-01-14 11:02:00 -05:00 committed by GitHub
parent de0d16e6d2
commit 6eb35881c0
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
2 changed files with 65 additions and 2 deletions

View file

@ -47,15 +47,22 @@ func RedirectSlashes(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
} else {
path = r.URL.Path
}
if len(path) > 1 && path[len(path)-1] == '/' {
// Trim all leading and trailing slashes (e.g., "//evil.com", "/some/path//")
path = "/" + strings.Trim(path, "/")
// Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to prevent "/\evil.com" style redirects
// that some clients may interpret as protocol-relative.
path = strings.ReplaceAll(path, `\`, `/`)
// Collapse leading/trailing slashes and force a single leading slash.
path := "/" + strings.Trim(path, "/")
if r.URL.RawQuery != "" {
path = fmt.Sprintf("%s?%s", path, r.URL.RawQuery)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, path, 301)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)

View file

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
@ -271,3 +272,58 @@ func TestStripPrefix(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("got: %q, want: %q", resp, "404 page not found\n")
}
}
func TestRedirectSlashes_PreventBackslashRelativeOpenRedirect(t *testing.T) {
h := RedirectSlashes(http.NotFoundHandler())
tests := []struct {
name string
target string
}{
{
name: `raw backslash: /\evil.com/`,
target: `/\evil.com/`,
},
{
name: `encoded backslash: /%5Cevil.com/`,
target: "/%5Cevil.com/",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.test"+tc.target, nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
res := rr.Result()
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusMovedPermanently {
t.Fatalf("expected %d, got %d", http.StatusMovedPermanently, res.StatusCode)
}
loc := res.Header.Get("Location")
if loc == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected Location header to be set")
}
// The core security assertions:
if strings.Contains(loc, `\`) {
t.Fatalf("Location must not contain backslashes: %q", loc)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(loc, "//") {
t.Fatalf("Location must not be protocol-relative: %q", loc)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "/") {
t.Fatalf("Location must be an absolute-path reference starting with '/': %q", loc)
}
// Optional stronger assertion if your middleware normalizes to /evil.com exactly:
// (Keep or remove depending on your chosen behavior.)
if loc != "/evil.com" {
t.Fatalf("expected Location %q, got %q", "/evil.com", loc)
}
})
}
}