ClientIPFromXFF: fail closed on unparseable XFF entries
PR #967 review issue #6 (adam-p): the rightmost-untrusted walk previously treated a netip.ParseAddr failure the same as a trusted-prefix match — silently skip and keep walking left. That is unsafe. Rightmost-untrusted only works because we trust ourselves to be able to read every hop to the right of the client. An unparseable hop is indistinguishable from a hostile or missing one. Walking past it can let us "find" a client IP that is actually any prepended value an attacker chose to put further left in the chain — exactly the spoofing shape this middleware was written to prevent. Flip the !ok branch in rightmostUntrustedXFF from continue to return (zero, false). Trusted-prefix still continues, empties/whitespace still skip via trim, fail-closed only fires on actual parse failures. ClientIPFromXFFTrustedProxies and ClientIPFromHeader are unaffected: they are single-value reads and already produce no IP on parse failure by construction. Godoc: - ClientIPFromXFF gets one concise line stating the fail-closed contract (visible to library users). - rightmostUntrustedXFF's internal comment is expanded to explain the security rationale (visible to chi maintainers). The four cases pinned in the previous commit's TestXFF_FailClosedOnUnparseable now pass; full middleware test suite stays green. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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1 changed files with 12 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ func ClientIPFromHeader(trustedHeader string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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// of the given trusted CIDR prefixes. The first IP that is not trusted is
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// the client. Read it with [GetClientIP].
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//
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// An unparseable entry mid-chain aborts the walk and leaves no client IP
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// set (fail-closed) — we can't safely trust anything left of garbage.
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//
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// Use this when you sit behind one or more reverse proxies whose IP ranges
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// you can enumerate as CIDRs:
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//
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@ -193,8 +196,11 @@ func mergeXFF(headers []string) []string {
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}
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// rightmostUntrustedXFF walks all X-Forwarded-For header values right-to-left
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// across the merged chain, skipping IPs that match trustedPrefixes (and
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// unparseable / empty entries), and returns the first remaining valid IP.
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// across the merged chain, skipping trusted-prefix and empty entries, and
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// returns the first remaining valid IP. An unparseable entry encountered
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// mid-walk fails closed: the walk is abandoned and no IP is returned, since
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// an unparseable hop is indistinguishable from a hostile or missing one and
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// we cannot safely keep walking past it.
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//
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// Walks the headers lazily rather than calling [mergeXFF] so the common case
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// — one trusted hop, the rightmost entry is the client — returns on the very
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@ -215,7 +221,10 @@ func rightmostUntrustedXFF(headers []string, trustedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (ne
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continue
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}
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ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)
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if !ok || inAnyPrefix(ip, trustedPrefixes) {
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if !ok {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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if inAnyPrefix(ip, trustedPrefixes) {
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continue
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}
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return ip, true
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