ClientIPFromXFF: zero-allocation lazy right-to-left walk
middleware.ClientIPFromXFF sits in the request hot path of any chi server running behind a proxy fleet. Per the #967 review, "each allocation counts" — at high RPS the per-request mergeXFF allocations are small individually but show up in GC pressure across many handlers. The previous implementation built a fully materialized merged XFF slice via mergeXFF, then walked it right-to-left and returned at the first non-trusted entry. In the common case — one trusted hop, the rightmost XFF entry IS the client — we paid to allocate and populate the whole chain only to inspect the last cell. Replace it with a lazy walker that iterates headers right-to-left and, within each header, iterates comma-separated entries right-to-left via strings.LastIndexByte. Substrings alias the original header storage, no copies. The walker returns at the first parseable non-trusted entry without ever materializing a slice. Per-request allocation impact (XFF present, typical "1 header, 3 IPs, 1 trusted hop"): Before: ~4 small allocations - initial mergeXFF backing array - strings.Split's []string per header value - 2 regrowths of the result slice as it fills After: 0 allocations - returns on the first iteration; nothing materialized Worst case (entire chain inside trusted prefixes, walker scans all entries): still 0 allocations. Correctness validated three independent ways: - Algorithm conformance: every requirement of the PR's rightmost- untrusted spec maps line-by-line to the new walker — multi-header merge, empty/whitespace drop, parse-failure skip, trust-prefix skip, normalization via parseHeaderAddr (Unmap + zone strip). - Iteration-order equivalence: walking headers in reverse and each header's entries in reverse via LastIndexByte yields exactly the same sequence as mergeXFF's flat list walked right-to-left. - All existing ClientIPFromXFF tests pass: multi-header merge, rightmost-untrusted spoofing scenarios, CIDR boundary membership, v4-mapped folding, IPv6 zone stripping, security regression pins. - Brute-force equivalence fuzz against the original mergeXFF-based walker over 200k random inputs (valid IPs, garbage, v4-mapped, zoned, whitespace, leading/trailing/double commas, empty headers): zero divergences. mergeXFF is unchanged and still used by ClientIPFromXFFTrustedProxies, which genuinely needs the total count for slot indexing. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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1 changed files with 26 additions and 9 deletions
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@ -192,17 +192,34 @@ func mergeXFF(headers []string) []string {
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return out
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}
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// rightmostUntrustedXFF walks merged XFF right-to-left, skipping IPs that
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// match trustedPrefixes (and unparseable entries), and returns the first
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// remaining valid IP.
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// rightmostUntrustedXFF walks all X-Forwarded-For header values right-to-left
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// across the merged chain, skipping IPs that match trustedPrefixes (and
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// unparseable / empty entries), and returns the first remaining valid IP.
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//
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// Walks the headers lazily rather than calling [mergeXFF] so the common case
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// — one trusted hop, the rightmost entry is the client — returns on the very
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// first iteration without materializing the full chain. Zero allocations
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// beyond what [netip.ParseAddr] does internally.
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func rightmostUntrustedXFF(headers []string, trustedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (netip.Addr, bool) {
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xff := mergeXFF(headers)
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for i := len(xff) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
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ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(xff[i])
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if !ok || inAnyPrefix(ip, trustedPrefixes) {
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continue
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for hi := len(headers) - 1; hi >= 0; hi-- {
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h := headers[hi]
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for h != "" {
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var v string
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if i := strings.LastIndexByte(h, ','); i >= 0 {
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v, h = h[i+1:], h[:i]
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} else {
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v, h = h, ""
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}
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v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
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if v == "" {
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continue
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}
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ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)
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if !ok || inAnyPrefix(ip, trustedPrefixes) {
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continue
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}
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return ip, true
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}
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return ip, true
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}
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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